Abstract. Pass observed that universal composable zero-knowledge (UCZK) protocols in the common reference string (CRS) model, where a common reference string is selected trustily by a trusted third party and is known to all players, lose deniability that is a natural property of any ZK protocol in the plain model [33] . An open problem (or, natural query) raised in the literature is: are there any other essential security properties, other than the well-known deniability property, that could be lost by universal composable zero-knowledge in the common reference string model, in comparison with UC security in the plain model? In this work, we answer this open question (or, natural query), by showing that UCZK protocols in the CRS model could lose concurrent general composability (CGC) and proof of knowledge (POK) properties that are very important and essential security implications of UCZK in the plain model. This is demonstrated by concrete attacks.
Introduction
Universal composability (UC) is a powerful notion proposed by Canetti [6] to describe cryptographic protocols that behave like ideal functionality, and can be composed in arbitrary way. The salient feature of UC secure protocol is that its security preserves even when it is composed with any arbitrary protocols (unpredictable environment) concurrently in asynchronous networks. In such settings, a protocol execution may run concurrently with an unknown number of other protocols. These arbitrary protocols may be executed by the same parties or other parties, they may have potentially related inputs and the scheduling of message delivery may be adversarily coordinated. Furthermore, the local outputs of a protocol execution may be used by other protocols in an unpredictable way.
In the framework of UC security, a generic definition is given for what it means for a protocol to "securely realize a given ideal functionality". Here, an "ideal functionality" is a set of instructions for a "trusted party" that obtains the inputs of the participants and provides them with the desired outputs. Informally, a protocol securely carries out a given ideal functionality if no adversary can gain more advantages from an attack on a real execution of the protocol, than from an attack on an ideal process where the parties merely hand their inputs to a trusted party with the appropriate functionality and obtain their outputs from it (without any other interaction). In other words, it is required that a real execution can be emulated in the ideal process.
Traditionally, emulation means that for any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A attacking a real protocol execution, in which A controls the communication channels and potentially corrupts parties, there should exist an "ideal process adversary" or simulator S that causes the outputs of the parties in the ideal process to be essentially the same as the outputs of the parties in a real execution. In the UC framework, an additional adversarial entity Z, called the environment, is introduced. As is hinted by its name, Z represents the external environment that consists of arbitrary protocol executions that may be running concurrently with the given protocol. This environment generates the inputs to all parties, read all outputs, and in addition interacts with the adversary in an arbitrary way throughout the computation. Then, a protocol is said to UC realize a given ideal functionality F if for any "real-life" adversary A there exists an "ideal-process adversary" S, such that no environment Z can tell whether it is interacting with A and parties running the protocol, or with S and parties interacting with F in the ideal process. (In a sense, here Z serves as an "interactive distinguisher" between a run of the protocol and the ideal process with access to F). One salient and advantageous feature of UC security is the implication of concurrent general composability (CGC), i.e., composability concurrently with arbitrary protocols or unpredictable environment.
Zero-knowledge (ZK) protocols allow a prover to validate theorems to a verifier without giving away any other knowledge other than the theorems being true (i.e., existing witnesses). This notion was introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [23] and its generality was demonstrated by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [22] . Since its introduction ZK has found numerous and extremely useful applications, and by now has been playing the central role in modern cryptography.
The concept of "proof of knowledge (POK)" was informally introduced in [23] , and was formally treated in [4, 19, 5] . POK systems, especially zero-knowledge POK (ZKPOK) systems, play a fundamental role in the designing of cryptographic schemes and protocols, and enable a formal complexity theoretic treatment of what does it mean for a machine to "know" something. Very roughly, by "proof of knowledge" we mean that a possibly malicious prover can convince that an N P statement is true if and only if it, in fact, "knows" (i.e., possesses) a witness to the statement (rather than only convincing the language membership of the statement, i.e., the fact that a corresponding witness exists).
Clearly, achieving US secure protocols, in particular UCZK protocols, would be highly desirable in modern cryptography, especially for cryptographic protocols running over Internet. We note that UCZK implies POK besides the above general CGC security implication in the plain model. In general, it has been shown that any ideal functionality can be UC realized, as long as a majority of players are assumed to be honest [6] . But, for the more general case where a majority of players may be corrupted (in particular, for the important case of two-party protocols where each player wishes to maintain its security even if the other player is corrupted), it is shown that large classes of functionalities, in particular most two-party protocols, cannot be UC realized in the plain model where no trusted setup is assumed [6, 9, 10, 29, 31] . The impossibility results of [6, 9, 10] is further shown to be hold for any definition that implies security under the composition operation considered by the UC framework. Therefore, in the natural setting of no trusted setup and no honest majority (including the important two-party case), it is impossible to obtain security in a setting where protocols are run concurrently with arbitrary other protocols. Therefore, whenever this level of security is desired, some setup assumptions are necessary.
The typical setup assumption (in particular, considered in this work) is the common reference string (CRS) model (we note that our observations also apply to the public-key model). In the CRS model all parties are given a common, public reference string that is ideally and trustily chosen from a given distribution. A large number of round-efficient UC-secure protocols have been developed in the CRS model. In this work, we focus on UC security for (round-efficient) ZK protocols in the CRS model.
Pass observed that universal composable zero-knowledge protocols in the common reference string model lose deniability that is a natural property of any ZK protocol in the plain model [33] . An open problem (or, natural query) raised in the literature is: are there any other essential security properties, other than the well-known deniability property, that could be lost by universal composable zero-knowledge in the common reference string model, in comparison with UC security in the plain model? In this work, we answer this open question (or, natural query), by showing that UCZK protocols in the CRS model could lose concurrent general composability (CGC) and proof of knowledge (POK) properties that are very important and essential security implications of UCZK in the plain model. This is demonstrated by concrete attacks.
Related works
Very recently, we noted the related independent work of [8] . The work of [8] clarifies the potential weakness of UC security in the common reference string model in general, with deniability loss as an illustrative example for ZK. In a sense, our work could also be viewed to exemplify, in another essential way (other than the well-known deniability loss), the general theme observed in the independent work of [8] on UC with global setup. More detailed discussions are presented in Section 4.
We briefly recall preliminaries in this section. We assume the reader is familiar with some basic definitions: witness indistinguishability, argument/proof of knowledge, commitments, public-key encryption and signatures, etc. We also assume the reader is familiar with the UC framework (cf. [18, 6, 12, 7] ). Detailed presentation is deferred to the full version, due to space limitation.
Definition 1 (Σ-protocol [13]). A 3-round public-coin protocol P, V is said to be a Σ-protocol for a relation R if the following hold:
-Completeness. If P , V follow the protocol, the verifier always accepts.
-Special soundness. From any common input x of length n and any pair of accepting conversations on input x, (a, e, z) and (a, e , z ) where e = e , one can efficiently compute w such that (x, w) ∈ R. Here a, e, z stand for the first, the second and the third message respectively and e is assumed to be a string of length k (that is polynomially related to n) selected uniformly at random in {0, 1} k .
-Special honest verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK). There exists a PPT simulator S, which on input x (where there exists a w such that (x, w) ∈ R) and a random challenge stringê, outputs an accepting conversation of the form (â,ê,ẑ), with the probability distribution that is indistinguishable from that of the real conversation (a, e, z) between the honest P (w) and V on input x. A Σ-protocol is called perfect/statistical Σ-protocol, if it is perfect/statistical SHVZK.
Σ-protocols are very useful cryptographic tools. A very large number of Σ-protocols have been developed in the literature. In particular, (the parallel repetition of) Blum's protocol for DHC [3] is a computational Σ-protocol for N P, and most practical Σ-protocols for number-theoretical languages (e.g., DLP and RSA [34, 25] , etc) are of perfect SHVZK property. More details about Σ-protocols and their applications can be found in [16] .
The OR-proof of Σ-protocols [14] . One basic construction with Σ-protocols allows a prover to show that given two inputs x 0 , x 1 , it knows a w such that either (x 0 , w) ∈ R 0 or (x 1 , w) ∈ R 1 , but without revealing which is the case (i.e., witness indistinguishable). Specifically, given two Σ-protocols
, with random challenges of, without loss of generality, the same length k, consider the following protocol P, V , which we call Σ OR . The common input of P, V is (x 0 , x 1 ) and P has a private input w such that (x b , w) ∈ R b .
-P computes the first message a b in P b , V b , using x b , w as private inputs. P chooses e 1−b at random, runs the SHVZK simulator of
, and lets (a 1−b , e 1−b , z 1−b ) be the output. P finally sends a 0 , a 1 to V . -V chooses a random k-bit string e and sends it to P . Ω-protocols [18] . An Ω-protocol is a Σ-protocol in the common reference string (CRS) model, with a special straight-line simulation/extraction property. Specifically, an Ω-protocol P, V [σ] for an N P-relation R and common reference string σ, is a Σ-protocol for relation R with the following additional properties:
-For a given distribution ensemble D, on security parameter 1 n a common reference string σ is drawn from D n . The players take σ as an additional input (to generate messages from them). Naturally, the simulator S in the definition of Σ-protocol may also take σ as an additional input.
-There exists a polynomial-time extractor E = (E 1 , E 2 ) such that the first element of the output of
, if there exist two accepting conversations (a, e, z) and (a, e , z ) with e = e on common input x and CRS σ, then , (a, e, z) ) outputs w such that (x, w) ∈ R.
Notice that the above second property is similar to the special soundness of Σ-protocols. For a Σ-protocol, there could exist an accepting conversation even for an invalid proof, but two accepting conversations (with the same firstround message but different second-round challenges) guarantee that the proof is valid. Here, for a Ω-protocol, the extractor E can always extract something from any conversation, but it might not be the witness if there is only one accepting conversation. However, having two different accepting conversations guarantees the extracted value is indeed a witness.
A natural way to construct Ω-protocols is as follows: the common reference string will consist of a random public-key pk for a semantically-secure encryption scheme. Then for a given (x, w) ∈ R, we will construct an encryption c of w under public-key pk, and then construct a Σ-protocol to prove that the value encrypted in c is indeed a witness w such that (x, w) ∈ R.
As with Σ-protocol, we can construct the OR-proof combining a Ω-protocol and a Σ-protocol.
The zero-knowledge functionality [6, 12] . The ZK functionality F R ZK , parameterized by a relation R, is presented in Figure 1 (page 6 ). In the functionality, the prover sends to the functionality the input x together with a witness w. If R(x, w) holds, then the functionality forwards x to the verifier. As pointed in [6] , this is actually a proof of knowledge in that the verifier is assured that the prover actually knows w. One shortcoming of the above formulation is that we will be designing and analyzing protocols in the common reference string model, and so they will be operating in the F D CRS -hybrid model, where F D CRS is the CRS generation functionality that, for a given security parameter 1 n , chooses a string from distribution D n and hands it to all parties and the adversary (but not directly to the environment). However, directly realizing F R ZK in the F D CRS -hybrid model and using the universal composition theorem would result in a composed protocol where a new instance of the reference string is needed for each proof. This is extremely inefficient and does not reflect the notion of the CRS model, where an unbounded number of protocol instances would use the same copy of the string. Canetti and Rabin [12] suggested the following notion to cope with this problem:
-Universal composition with joint state: Let F and G be ideal functionalities, and letF denote the "multi-session extension of F", in whicĥ F will run multiple copies of F, where each copy is identified by a special sub-session identifier (ssid). Now, let π be a protocol in the F-hybrid model, and letρ be a protocol that securely realizesF in the G-hybrid model. Then, construct the composed protocol π [ρ] by replacing all the copies of F in π by a single copy ofρ. The universal composition with joint state theorem of [12] states that π [ρ] , running in the G-hybrid model, correctly emulates π in the F-hybrid model. In this section, we present a concurrent general composition attack to the protocol of [18] that is UCZK in the common reference string model.
3.1
The protocol structure of UCZK of [18] We first recall the protocol structure of the UCZK protocol of [18] .
Common reference string: (verk, σ ), where verk is a random verification key of a signature scheme secure against chosen message attacks, σ is the public reference string for the underlying Ω-protocol (typically, σ is a random public-key of semantically-secure PKE). 
Notes:
The above protocol is shown to be UCZK in the common reference string model, assuming static corruptions [18] . For UCZK with adaptive corruptions, the above protocol is augmented as follows: In Phase-2, the prover does not send a = (a L , a vk ) directly. Rather, it first commits to a and the auxiliary information aux by using a special trapdoor commitment scheme, called simulation-sound trapdoor commitments (SSTC), following the paradigm of [15] . Then, in the third-round of the OR-proof of Phase-2, the prover decommits accordingly and reveals a. The following CGC attack is described against the above UCZK with static corruption, but it can be trivially extended to work on the augmented adaptive-corruption version as well.
The CGC attack
To present a CGC attack, we need to first design a (different) protocol, and then show that when composed with the designed protocol the UCZK protocol of [18] is not secure. We present a natural and also very useful protocol, and show that when composed with this natural and practical protocol, a malicious adversary can convince the honest verifier of any statement in the original UCZK protocol of [18] but without knowing any witness for the statement being proved. This shows that UCZK protocol in the common reference string model could lose concurrent general composability property and also the POK property. We suggest that such security losses might be more harmful, in comparison with the loss of deniability observed in [33] .
The encrypt/commit-then-proof protocol. The protocol to be composed with the UCZK of [18] is the natural and very useful encrypt/committhen-proof protocol P , V , described as follows.
Main-proof stage: consists of two phases:
Phase-1: The verifier V generates and sends to the prover P a random public-key σ for a semantically-secure PKE scheme. Here, σ can also be viewed as the first-round message of a commitment scheme. Phase-2: The prover P encrypts (i.e., commits) w to c using the public-key σ . Then, P proves to V that the value committed is indeed a witness for x ∈ L, by executing a Σ-protocol with V . We denote by a L , e L , z L the first-round, second-round and third-round message of the Σ-protocol.
We remark that the above encrypt/commit-then-proof protocol is a natural and very useful protocol in practice. The encrypt/commit-then-proof paradigm has been employed in a number of works for various cryptographic tasks and settings (e.g., [28, 30, 11, 1] , etc). When the protocol works in the public-key model with σ as the verifier's public-key, such protocol is also a common paradigm for achieving plaintext-aware (interactive and verifiable) encryption (e.g., [27] ), which is also used in group signature and group encryption systems.
Message schedule of the CGC attack. We now describe the message schedule of the CGC attack, that enables an adversary to convinces any statement in the original UCZK protocol of [18] but without knowing any corresponding N P-witness.
The adversary A runs the UCZK protocol of [18] and the above commit-thenproof protocol concurrently, by playing the role of prover in the UCZK protocol of [18] and playing the role of verifier in the commit-then-proof protocol. In other words, the adversary A corrupts and controls the prover P of UCZK of [18] and the verifier V of the commit-then-proof protocol at the onset of the computation. A schedules the messages as follows.
1.
A first executes the UCZK with V on common input x and the common reference string (verk, σ ). For presentation simplicity, we call such execution the first session. Specifically, it generates a key-pair (vk, sk) for a one-time strong signature, sends vk to the verifier V , just as the honest prover does.
When it moves into Phase-2 of the UCZK, A suspends the first session. 2. A executes the commit-then-prove protocol with P on common input x (x could be set by A via the environment). For presentation simplicity, we call the execution of the commit-then-prove protocol the second session. Specifically, A sends σ (got from the CRS of the first session) to P as the Phase-1 message of the second session. After receiving from P the firstround message of Phase-2 of the second session, A suspends the second session. Note that the first-round message of Phase-2 of the second session from P consists of c (that encrypts w) and the first-round message a L of the underlying Σ-protocol executed in Phase-2 of the second session. 3. Now, A continues the first session, and works as follows. On (vk, verk), it generates a simulated conversation (a vk , e vk , z vk ) for the Σ-protocol of Phase-2 of the first session (that is used to prove the knowledge of a signature of vk under verk), by running the underlying SHVZK simulator. Then, A sends (c, a L , a vk ) to V as the first-round message of Phase-2 of the first session. After receiving from V the random challenge e (i.e., the second-round message of the OR-proof of Phase-2 of the first session), A sets e L = e ⊕ e vk and suspends the first session again. Note that (c, a L ) are got from the second session. 4. A continues the second session again, sends e L = e⊕e vk to P as the secondround message of Phase-2 of the second session. After receiving from P the last-round message e L of the second session, A stops the second session. 5. A continues the first-session again, sends z = ((e L , z L ), (e vk , z vk )) to V as the last-round message of the OR-proof of Phase-2 of the first session. 6. Finally, A applies the one-time strong signing key sk on the whole transcript of the first session to get a valid signature s, and sends s to V . Note that A can do this, as the one-time strong key pair (vk, sk) are generated by itself.
is an accepting conversation of the Ω-protocol for showing x ∈ L, (a vk , e vk , z vk is an accepting conversation for showing the knowledge of the signature of vk under verk, and also e = e L ⊕ e vk . Furthermore, the one-time strong signature s is also valid. This means that, from the viewpoint of V , A has successfully convinced V of the statement "x ∈ L" in the first session with the UCZK protocol, but A actually does not know any corresponding N P-witness! It is also easy to see that the above CGC attack schedule can be trivially extended to the augmented adaptive corruption version of the UCZK of [18] .
Notes: The adversary A does not use the same CRS in the second session, but a part of the CRS. Also, the commit-then-proof protocol is run in the plain model. We remark that A can potentially use a completely different (but maliciously related to CRS) message in Phase-1 of the second session. In general, A can potentially malleate the CRS of one session into some message of another concurrent session that is completely different with the CRS but maliciously related. We also note that it is impossible to prevent transparent adversaries.
Specifically, an adversary runs the same protocol twice in two session (in one session, the same CRS could be sent by a player) and forwards the messages from one session to another session (i.e., the transcripts in the two sessions are identical). Such transparent adversary is impossible to prevent, and is not viewed as a harmful adversarial activity by definition, analogue to the definition of non-malleability [17] .
Comments
We comment that the above CGC attack contradicts our intuition for the security guaranteed by universal composable security. We remark that it is true that UC security in the plain model does guarantee the composability security with arbitrary protocols (environment), and the POK property for ZK in particular. The implicit reason, as discussed in the independent work of [8] , is that in the traditional UC formulation in the common reference string model the common reference string is not given to the environment. In general, in the UC formulation of [6] , the environment is not allowed to directly invoke (interact) with subroutines. That is, the environment is not allowed to interact directly with the ideal functionality F (in particular, the CRS generation functionality F D CRS in our case) in the F-hybrid model [6, 12] . This fact allows the CRS simulation by the ideal-process adversary in security analysis. The work of [8] pointed out the potential security losses for UC in the common reference string model in general, with deniability loss as an illustrative example for UCZK in the common reference string model. Our attack shows that UCZK in the common reference string model could lose more essential and important security guarantees, i.e., concurrent general composability and POK that are very essential security implications of UCZK in the plain model. In this sense our work could also be viewed to exemplify, in another essential way (other than the well-known deniability loss [33] ), the general theme observed in [8] on UC with global setup.
